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OMNISCIENCE AND THE ARROW OF TIME
Linda Zagzebski

This paper argues that the enduring dilemma of divine foreknowledge and
human free will is an instance of a much deeper dilemma in the arrow of
time. The assumption that the past has a kind of necessity that the future
lacks is inconsistent with the principle that temporal necessity is transferred
over entailment and the possibility that a proposition about the past entails
a proposition about the future. A closer look at temporal modality leads to
the proposal that the causal arrow of time is the underpinning of the modal
arrow of time. The idea that propositions about the past and their negations
are not causable, whereas propositions about the future (and perhaps some
of their negations) are causable is inconsistent with the transfer of causability principle and a variety of metaphysical postulates that imply that a
proposition about the future entails or is entailed by a proposition about the
past. This dilemma is independent of determinism. No particular way to
resolve the dilemma is compelling, but is a matter of metaphysical judgment. Positions on free will, determinism, and omniscience are irrelevant to
solving the dilemma in its most general form.

I. The modal arrow of time

One of the ways in which the past and the future are allegedly asymmetrical is that the past has a kind of necessity the future lacks. Events in
the past are purportedly necessary simply because they are past, not
because of any metaphysical properties other than pastness. So it is said
that we can do nothing about spilled milk, and that is meant to contrast
with the idea that potentially we can do something about milk that is not
yet spilled. This modal asymmetry is sometimes associated with an ontological asymmetry- the past is real, the future is not. The ontological
asymmetry can clearly be questioned, but I mention it to call attention to
the fact that all of the temporal asymmetries define a property of the past
by contrast with the future. The nature of an asymmetry is to be two-sided.
So the idea that the past is closed (fixed, necessary) is one side of a single
intuition the other side of which is the intuition that the future is open
(tmfixed, contingent). The Principle of the Necessity of the Past therefore
has a correlate: the Principle of the Contingency of the Future.
Perhaps the intuition of the necessity of the past is stronger than the intuition of the contingency of the future. That is possible, but then it is imporFAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
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tant to see that the rejection of either side of the asymmetry threatens the
other and suggests that the idea of modal temporal asymmetry is confused.
If the kind of necessity possessed by the past is possessed by the future, or
even if it is possible that it is possessed by the future, the necessity of the
past cannot be something it has simply in virtue of its pastness.
Sometimes when people say that an event in the past is now necessary
what they mean is that nobody has any causal power over it. We can lack
causal power over an event because it is causally necessary or because it is
in the past, and these are not the same thing. Causal necessity and contingency are not temporally asymmetrical. Roughly, a causally necessary event
E is one that is such that the conjunction of causal laws and events prior to E
are sufficient for E to occur, whereas a causally contingent event E is one
that is such that the conjunction of causal laws and events prior to E are not
sufficient for E to occur. The causal necessity or contingency of an event has
nothing to do with whether it is in our past or our future. An event possesses causal necessity or contingency in virtue of its enduring relations to other
events. Assuming the metaphysical law that a cause must precede its effect,
an event's causal necessity or contingency is determined by its enduring
relations to events previous to it. But whether or not causes must precede
effects, the causal modality of an event is not temporally asymmetrical.
Even if it is possible for an event to be causally necessary because it is determined by an event later in time, its status as causally necessary never
changes. There are causally contingent events in the past as well as in the
future, and there are causally necessary events in the future as well as in the
past.' When an event has the necessity of the past, its temporal status is sufficient to make it beyond the power of anybody to do anything about it. But
it can still be causally contingent. Similarly, if an event has the contingency
of the future, there is nothing about its temporal status that prevents it from
being such that we can do something about it. But it can still be causally
necessary. Therefore, it does not follow from the fact that an event is temporally contingent that we can do something about it since the event might be
beyond our power for some other reason, say, because it is causally necessary. Similarly, it does not follow from the fact that an event is causally contingent that we can do something about it since the event might be beyond
our power for some other reason, say, because it is in the past.
So we lack power over causally necessary events and we also lack
power over the past. The reason why we lack power over the past is presumably the metaphysical law that causes must precede effects, but the
necessity of the past need not depend upon any explanation for our lack of
power over the past. We will return to the causal arrow in section II. For
this section I will not assume any laws of causality. What I will assume is
that the modalities of necessity and contingency apply to the past and the
future respectively and are related in standard ways. Let temporal modality be expressed by "now-necessary", "now-possible", "now-impossible",
and "now-contingent". I will assume the following relations among the
temporal modalities: P is now-necessary if and only if not p is now-impossible. If p is now-necessary, p is now-possible. If p, P is now-possible. To
say that p is now-contingent is to say that it is now-possible that p and it is
now-possible that not p.
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The Principle of the Necessity of the Past can be formulated as follows:

Principle of the Necessity of the Past
If B is a proposition about the past and B is true, then nect B.
Given the relation defined above between the now-necessary and the nowpossible, when B is a true proposition about the past, it follows that not
pOSStnot B.
Systems of modal logic always include a transfer of necessity principle
for logical necessity. As applied to temporal necessity, the principle is the
following:
Transfer of Necessity Principle (TNP)
Nect p, Nec (p ->q) > Nect q,
which is logically equivalent to
Transfer of Possibility Principle (TPP)
POSt p, Nec (p->q) > POSt q.
TNP has the consequence that logically necessary propositions have the
necessity of the past since a logically necessary truth is entailed by every
proposition. I find this peculiar, but since nothing in what follows turns on
it, I will not modify the principle here in the interests of simplicity.2
Let us say that an essentially omniscient foreknower (EOF) is any being
x who satisfies the following condition: Necessarily, for any proposition p
and time t at which x exists, x believes p at t if and only if p. Essential
omniscience can be shown to be inconsistent with modal temporal asymmetry as described above by the following argument:

1st Dilemma of Foreknowledge and Modal Temporal Asymmetry
Let B = the proposition that I will pour tea at noon tomorrow.

(1)

There is (and was before now) an essentially omniscient foreknower (EOF) [Assumption for dilemma]

The Principle of the Contingency of the Future tells us that
(2)

It is now- possible that B and it is now- possible that not B.

From (1) and the definition of an EOF it follows that
(3)

Necessarily (B ->The EOF believed before now that B), and
necessarily (not B ->The EOF believed before now that not B) .

By the Transfer of Possibility Principle (TPP), (2) and (3) entail
(4)

It is now- possible that the EOF believed before now that Band

it is now- possible that the EOF believed before now that not B.
From (1) and the definition of an EOF we get
(5)

Either the EOF believed before now that B or the EOF believed
before now that not B.
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From the Principle of the Necessity of the Past we get
(6)

If he did, it is not now-possible that he did not, and if he did
not, it is not now-possible that he did.

(5) and (6) entail
(7)

Either it is not now- possible that he did not or it is not nowpossible that he did.

But (7) contradicts (4).3
We can formulate a parallel argument using TNP instead of TPP:
2nd Dilemma of Foreknowledge and Modal Temporal Asymmetry
(1)

There is (and was before now) an essentially omniscient foreknower (EOF) [Assumption for dilemma]

(1) and the Principle of the Necessity of the Past tell us that
(2')

Either it is now-necessary that the EOF believed B before now
or it is now-necessary that the EOF believed not B before now.

From (1) and the definition of an EOF it follows that
(3')

Necessarily (The EOF believed before now that B -> B), and
necessarily (The EOF believed before now that not B -> not B)

By the Transfer of Necessity Principle (TNP), (2') and (3') entail
(4')

Either it is now-necessary that B or it is now-necessary that not
B.

(4') is logically equivalent to
(5')

Either it is not now-possible that B or it is not now-possible that
notB.

From the Principle of the Contingency of the Future we get
(6')

It is now-possible that B and it is now-possible that not B.

But (6') contradicts (5').
These arguments have nothing to do with free will. They show that the
conflict between an essentially omniscient foreknower and free will rests
upon a deeper conflict between essential omniscience and the modal asymmetry of past and future. In short, the following form an inconsistent triad:
(a) The existence of modal temporal asymmetry expressed in the contingency of the future and the necessity of the past [premises (2) and (6), and
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(2') and (6')].
(b) The possibility that there is an essentially omniscient foreknower.
[Premise (1)]
( c) The Transfer of Possibility Principle or equivalently, the Transfer of
Necessity Principle.
The problem of fatalism is not really about freedom or fate; it is about a
type of modality that is temporally asymmetrical and that is transferred
over logical entailment. If this type of modality is coherent, it rules out the
possibility of essential omnisicience. It follows that God could not have
"given up" infallible foreknowledge in order to save human freedom since
fundamentally the problem is not about free will at all.'
But the problem is even more general than this triad illustrates. The
reason essential omniscience conflicts with temporal modality and the
transfer principles is that the existence of an EOF requires that a proposition about the past entails a proposition about the future. But it straightforwardly follows from TNP that a proposition that is now-necessary cannot entail a proposition that is not now-necessary. So if the past is nownecessary and the future is not, a proposition about the past cannot entail
a proposition about the future. Further, it follows from TPP that a proposition that is now-possible cam10t entail a proposition that is not now-possible. But false propositions about the past are not now-possible. If the
future is contingent, and p is about the future, both p and not pare nowpossible. But if p is logically equivalent to a proposition about the past,
one of either p or not p entails a false proposition about the past. Hence a
proposition that is now-possible entails a proposition that is not now-possible, contrary to TPP. The conclusion is that if asymmetrical temporal
modality is coherent, it can obey TNP and TPP, or it can permit a proposition about the past to entail or be logically equivalent to a proposition
about the future, but not both.
The root of the problem, then, is that it is impossible for there to be a
type of modality that has the following features:
(a) The past and future are asymmetrical in that the past is necessary
with respect to this type of modality, whereas the future is contingent with
respect to this type of modality.
(b') There are propositions about the past that entail (or are logically
equivalent to) propositions about the future.
(c) TNP (or equivalently, TPP) obtains.
For most forms of modality M, we simply accept the transfer principles for
M. But if there is a type of modality that is temporally asymmetrical, that
pressures us to resist any principle of temporal modality that results in the
past having the contingency of the future or the future having the necessity
of the past under pain of reducing temporal modality to incoherence. It
might be thought that a way out of this dilemma is to say that the transfer
principles need not transfer the same type of necessity or possibility to q as
is possessed by p. We could formulate a principle that transfers a type of
necessity to q from the type of necessity possessed by p, whether or not it is
the same type of necessity in both cases. This approach would avoid the
incoherence of maintaining that TNP forces us to conclude that the future
has the necessity of the past, but it does mean that the future has whatever
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type of necessity is transferred from the necessity of the past. This
approach faces the same dilemma as the one addressed in this section, only
it is more subtle. If the intuitions that undergird the necessity of the past
require modal temporal asymmetry, the idea that the future inherits a type
of necessity from the past undermines those intuitions. Modal temporal
asymmetry is in tension with (b') and (c ) whether or not the necessity the
future inherits from the past is exactly the same kind of necessity as the
necessity of the past.
We have seen that the problem of foreknowledge and free will is not
about free will. Now we see that it is not even about foreknowledge. It is
about the logic of a modality that expresses a common view of time. Either
(a), (b'), or (c ) is false. Either the transfer principles are false, it is not possible for a proposition about the past to entail a proposition about the future,
or the modal asymmetry of time is confused.s Since the transfer principles
are a part of every system of modal logic, the price of denying them is to
adopt a non-standard system of temporal modality. But there is also a high
metaphysical cost for taking the second option. If it is impossible that a
proposition about the past can entail a proposition about the future, much
more is ruled out than the possibility of infallible foreknowledge. It is
impossible that there is a perfect rememberer, a being who infallibly
remembers everyone of her past conscious states. It is impossible that
there is a perfectly constant lover, someone who necessarily continues to
love once he begins to love. It is impossible that matter is indestructible. In
fact, it is impossible that anything is indestructible. Each of these metaphysical hypotheses requires that it is metaphysically necessary that if
some proposition about the past is true (e.g., matter existed), some proposition about the future is true (e.g., matter will exist next year). I do not find
this option very appealing either."
The final option is to reject modal temporal asymmetry as described in
this section. Some form of temporal asymmetry is so firmly ingrained in
ordinary thinking that it is virtually impossible to give it up, but that does
not mean that the temporal arrow has been accurately described using
standard modal notions. In order to choose among rejecting (a), (b'), or (c ),
I propose that we take a closer look at the temporal arrow.

II. The causal arrow of time
In describing temporal asymmetry in section I, I made it artificially simple. I also followed common practice in subsuming temporal asymmetry
under the standard modalities of necessity and possibility which are
assumed to be related in standard ways. This approach may make it seem
obvious that the modalities of past and future are describable by the
axioms of modal logic, including TNP. But I find it interesting that ordinary people rarely refer to the past as "necessary", and it is even less clear
that they assume the standard relations among the modalities in their
thinking about time. If a proposition is necessary, it is possible, but do we
normally think of the past as possible? The negation of a necessary truth is
impossible, but it seems to me that instead of treating propositions about
the past and their negations as having contrary modalities, both the actual
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past and all alternate pasts are typically put in the category of what we cannot do anything about. Perhaps the logical relations among the necessary, the
possible, and the impossible are more precise renderings of vague and
untutored (and untrustworthy) ordinary intuitions about time. But it is
also possible that the relations assumed in the previous section express to
some extent a false precision. The idea that we cannot do anything about
the past whereas we can in principle do something about (a portion of) the
future is part of a network of ideas about time and causality. If there is an
inconsistency within the network, the resolution of the conflict ought to do
as little damage as possible to the network as a whole.
I will not attempt to identify all the key components of the network of
beliefs about time and causation that underly the intuition of modal temporal asymmetry, but I want to call attention to a few features that I think
are relevant to resolving the inconsistency identified in the last section.
First of all, I suspect that the intuitive basis for modal temporal asymmetry
would be badly shaken if certain laws of causality turned out to be false, in
particular, the law that causes must precede their effects. If I am right in
this conjecture, what leads us to think there is a modal temporal arrow is
our beliefs about what accompanies past and future, not pastness and futurity per se. The reason why we think we can do nothing about spilled milk
may not be the pastness of the spilled milk in itself, but pastness conjoined
with the metaphysical principle that the cause must be prior to the effect. If
this is the deeper intuition behind the modal asymmetry of time, it would
explain the fact that we do not think our power over the future is on a par
with our lack of power over the past. The entire past is outside the realm of
causal power, but that does not mean that the entire future is within the
realm of causal power. We have no causal power over the past because it is
too late to either cause it or to prevent it whether or not any of it is causally
contingent, but we also have no power to prevent what is causally necessary in the future, although we can cause it. In fact, somebody or something must cause it if it is causally necessary. The most interesting category
is that which we have both the power to cause and the power to prevent. If
there is anything in this category, it has to be in the future. Temporal asymmetry, then, is fundamentally an asymmetry in what is causable. Anything
that is either past or causally impossible is not causable. What is neither
past nor causally impossible is causable. We can define the causally closed
and causally open in terms of what is causable: Proposition p is causally
closed just in case neither p nor not p is causable. Proposition p is causally
open just in case both p and not pare causable. The entire past is causally
closed; some of the future (it is hoped) is causally open.
The modes of causable and not causable as just described do not correspond very well to the standard modes of necessary, possible, impossible,
and contingent. The actual past is not causable, but alternative pasts are
not causable either. If it is too late to make something have happened, it is
too late to make something else have happened instead. So if a proposition
p is about the past, neither p nor not p is causable; p and not p are causally
closed. This is one dis analogy with the standard modalities since if p is
necessary, its negation is impossible. The realm of standard modality is
divided into the possible and the impossible. The necessary is a subset of
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the possible and the contingent is the possible that is not necessary. In contrast, the modes I am suggesting divide events into the causable and the
not causable. There is a set of propositions p which are such that both p
and not p are not causable. There is a set of propositions p which are such
that both p and not pare causable. And there is a set of propositions p
which are such that pis causable and not p is not causable. I am not assuming that none of these sets is empty. The three categories are meant only to
describe the logical possibilities of causability.
I propose that the intuition of temporal asymmetry is related to causability in the following way:
( i ) If a proposition p is about the past, p is not causable and not p is not
causable. Propositions about the past are causally closed. [Principle of the
Causal Closure of the Past]
(ii) If a proposition p is about the future and p is true, p is causable.
[Principle of the Causability of the Future
(iii) There are propositions p about the future which are such that both p
and not p are causable. Such propositions are causally open.
(iv) There are propositions p about the future which are such that p is
causable and not p is not causable. The former are causally necessary and
the latter are causally impossible.
These features seem to me to express the intuitive idea that a cause must
precede its effect and that some of the future is causally determined, but
some of it is not. Even if it turns out that all of the future is causally determined- and that needs to be decided on metaphysical and empirical
grounds, not by the logic of cause, the causal arrow as just described recognizes a difference between our causal relation to the past and our causal
relation to the future.
A more complicated part of the network of intuitions about time
involves the metaphysically necessary conditions for events of certain
kinds to occur. There is a time-honored metaphysical principle of causation
that nothing can come from nothing. According to that principle, the
proposition that something will exist in the future entails the proposition
that something existed in the past. If it is metaphysically necessary that no
object can come into existence uncaused, then the proposition that some x
will exist in the future entails that some y existed in the past that is in the
causal chain leading to the existence of x. If it is not metaphysically necessary that an object be caused by its actual causes, then the objects in the
causal chain leading to x in one world will not be identical to the objects in
the causal chain leading to x in another world. Nonetheless, there is no
possible world containing a future x that does not have something existing
in the past that is causally necessary for x's existence in that world.
Let us now consider the transfer principles for causability parallel to
those for necessity and possibility:
Transfer of Causability Principle (TCP)
Causable p, Nec (p - > q) > Causable q
Transfer of Noncausability Principle (TNCP)
Not causable p, Nec (p ->q) > Not causable q
These principles are false as stated and must be modified. Since a logically
necessary truth is entailed by every proposition, TCP has the consequence

r
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that if q is logically necessary, q is causable. But surely nobody has the
causal power to bring about the truth of a logically necessary proposition.
To avoid this problem TCP must be amended:
Transfer of Causability Principle 2 (TCP2)
Causable p, Nee (p -> q), & q is not logically necessary> Causable q
Similarly, since an impossible proposition entails every proposition, TNCP
has the consequence that if p is logically impossible, q is not causable no
matter what q is. It also needs to be amended:
Transfer ofNoncausability Principle 2 (TNCP2)
Not causable p, Nee (p ->q), & p is not logically impossible> Not causable q."
The causal arrow, the assumption that a proposition about the past
entails a proposition about the future, and TNCP2 can be shown to be
inconsistent. The argument is similar to the second dilemma of section I
except that since neither of the propositions The EOF believed B before now
and The EOF believed not B before now are causable, two contradictions follow. A more interesting comparison is the form of the dilemma using
TCP2 which is revealingly different from the first dilemma of section 1. The
causal arrow and TCP2 is inconsistent with the assumption that a proposition about the future entails a proposition about the past. The principle that
nothing can come from nothing will suffice to generate the inconsistency.
Let us consider the proposition that some human female will exist in the
future. If there is more than one future human female, pick one for the sake
of the argument and call her Eve. It is not necessary to assume that Eve's
existence is open, that is, that both the proposition that Eve will exist and
its negation are causable. It is sufficient that either Eve's existence or her
non-existence is causable. The dilemma therefore does not assume the
falsehood of determinism.
Dilemma of Causal Asymmetry
(10) Necessarily [(Eve will exist in the future -> The causally necessary conditions for Eve's existence obtained in the past, & (Eve
will not exist in the future -> the causally necessary conditions
for Eve's non-existence obtained in the past)]
The Principle of the Causability of the Future tell us that
(11) Either it is causable that Eve will exist or it is causable that Eve
will not exist.
From TCP2 we get
(12) Either it is causable that the causally necessary conditions for
Eve's existence obtained in the past or it is causable that the
causally necessary conditions for Eve's non-existence obtained
in the past.
From the Principle of the Causal Closure of the Past it follows that
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(13) It is neither causable that the causally necessary conditions for
Eve's existence obtained in the past nor causable that the
causally necessary conditions for Eve's non-existence obtained
in the past.
But (13) contradicts (12).
If Eve's existence is causally open, (11) will be a conjunction instead of a
disjunction, permitting the derivation of two contradictions by the above
pattern. The conclusion is that whether or not the future is causally open,
the following forms an inconsistent triad:
(a')

The past and future are causally asymmetrical in that the past is
not causable whereas the future is causable.

(b") There are propositions about the future that entail propositions
about the past.
(c')

TCP2 obtains.

I find this a particularly intriguing dilemma because there is an inconsistency in the causal arrow not only when a proposition about the past
entails or is equivalent to a proposition about the future, but even when a
proposition about the future entails a proposition about the past.
Furthermore, the dilemma does not depend upon the openness of the
future in the sense that for some propositions p about the future, both p
and not pare causable. The only assumption needed to generate the dilemma is that propositions about the future are causable, whether or not their
negations are causable as well.
III. The options
What are the options for avoiding inconsistency in the causal arrow of
time? How do they compare with those for escaping the inconsistency in the
modal arrow? The options for escaping the two dilemmas are as follows:
Modal Arrow dilemma
1.
The modal arrow is an illusion
2.
A proposition about the past cannot entail (nor be logically
equivalent to) a proposition about the future.
3.
TNP and TPP are false.
Causal Arrow dilemma
1.
The causal arrow is an illusion.
2.
A proposition about the future cannot entail or be entailed by a
proposition about the past.
3.
TCP2 and TNCP2 are false.
There is a difference in the plausibility of the first option in the two dilemmas if I am right that the causal arrow as described in section II is more plau-
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sible than the modal temporal arrow described in section 1. The two arrows
are obviously related, but they are not identical and I suggest that the intuitions about causality described in the last section are the underpinnings of
the modal arrow of time. If the law that causes must precede effects turned
out to be false, the modal arrow would collapse. Furthermore, the belief that
there are causally necessary events in the future puts an important limitation
on the intuition of temporal asymmetry that explains why the principle of
the contingency of the future is weaker than the principle of the necessity of
the past. The causal arrow reveals that; the modal temporal arrow does not.
Of course, further investigation may reveal that both arrows are illusory, but
I think the causal arrow is much less likely to be mistaken. I suggest, then,
that whereas the modal arrow may be confused, the first option to escape the
causal arrow dilemma is not very appealing and should be taken only as a
last resort. In any case, almost all writers on both sides of the debate over
theological fatalism assume the causal arrow.
That reduces our options for the causal dilemma to the second and third.
Consider next the second option. As we saw in the discussion of the modal
dilemma, there is a metaphysical price for taking the second option since it
rules out the possibility that a proposition about the past entails a proposition about the future, and hence it is impossible that matter is indestructible,
that there is a perfect rememberer, and many others. The second option in
the causal dilerruna is even more restrictive since it also rules out the possibility that a proposition about the future entails a proposition about the
past. So it makes the traditional metaphysical principle that nothing can
come from nothing metaphysically impossible. Furthermore, it is likely that
there are particular metaphysically necessary conditions that must obtain
prior to any given event. If so, the proposition that the event occurs entails
a proposition about conditions obtaining previously. A simple way this can
occur is when an event is part of a more complex event extended in time,
say a baseball game. A necessary condition for the ninth inning to begin is
that eight innings have been previously played. So the proposition
expressed by "The ninth inning is about to begin" entails "Eight innings
were played already." More complex conditions are those required for the
exercise of human agency. I am not interested in identifying any particular
conditions for human agency here. I merely want to point out that there
probably are some. For example, propositions about future human choices
probably entail propositions about the past existence of rational beings.
More subtle examples involve responses to past events. It is arguably necessary that nobody can forgive someone for a past wrong unless something
previously happened that is the object of the forgiveness. 9 But according to
the option we are considering, the transfer principles are permitted to
trump all of the metaphysical postulates we have considered: that matter is
indestructible, that nothing can come from nothing, that essential omniscience or a perfect rememberer is possible, that the beginning of the ninth
inning entails that eight innings have been previously played, etc. Of
course, some of these postulates may be quirky or have no basis in a plausible metaphysical theory. The issue, however, is whether their rejection
should be decided on metaphysical grounds or whether they should be
automatically eliminated because TCP2 and TNCP2 take precedence.
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The final option is to reject the transfer principles. TNP and TPP are considered to be indisputable by some writers on fatalism because TNP is an
axiom of modal logic, but the same defense cannot be made of TCP2 and
TNCP2. Neither is an instance of a standard transfer of modality principle
and causability is not a standard modality. TCP2 and TNCP2 need defense.
It seems to me that TCP2 and TNCP2 are probably false, but my purpose
in this paper is not to argue for their falsehood, but to argue that there are
metaphysical costs in adopting TCP2 and TNCP2 that are much more farreaching than merely denying the possibility of essential omniscience.
Rejecting TCP2 and TNCP2 leaves open the possibility that a proposition about the future entails a proposition about the past and that a proposition about the past entails a proposition about the future. Such possibilities in particular cases would be decided by features of logic and metaphysics that do not automatically give precedence to the transfer principles. This option has the advantage of not ruling out in advance the
hypothesis that nothing comes from nothing, that matter is indestructible,
that there is an essentially omniscient being, and many others. Whether
TNP and TPP are false also is somewhat more problematic because I have
already given reasons for thinking that the modal temporal arrow is confused, or at least incompletely described. Since it is not clear to me that the
standard modalities apply to time at all, I have no position on rejecting
TNP and TPP.lO
I conclude that the logic of modality does not force us to accept the
transfer of causability and non-causability principles. It does not even force
us to accept the transfer of necessity and the transfer of possibility principles for temporal modality. The way we escape the inconsistency in the
causal and modal arrows of time is the result of metaphysical choice.

III. The Tooley defense ofTNP
Michael Tooley argues in his critique of my book on foreknowledge that
TNP is true for temporally asymmetrical necessity as he defines it.!1 He
uses the convention of calling the necessity of the past accidental necessity,
which he defines as follows:
It is accidentally necessary that p at time t if and only if p is not preventable at t.

After a few attempts at interpreting preventability, Tooley settles on the
following definition of accidental necessity:
(AN) It is accidentally necessary that p at time t if and only if no
being, either actual or possible, acting at time t, could causally
bring it about that p is false. (220).
By this definition accidental necessity is not the same as the necessity of the
past, the modality I addressed in section I. Instead, accidental necessity is
close to what I have called causability:
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Why might one think that this connection [between accidental necessity and preventability] obtains? The basic reason is that, in the world
as it is, we can perform actions that determine, at least in part, how
the future is, but we cannot perform actions that determine how the
past is, and it seems plausible that it is this fact about the world that
leads many people to feel that there is a deep asymmetry between the
past and the future, and, in particular, that the past is fixed, or accidentally necessary, while the future is not. For suppose, by contrast,
that we were able to perform actions now that would determine how
the past is. Surely we would no longer view past events as accidentally necessary. (p. 219).
So Tooley thinks of accidental necessity as temporally asymmetrical in that
the past has it and some part of the future does not. Further, it is a type of
necessity that depends upon the view that we have no causal power over
the past. Given that intuition, we can no more bring about the past than
prevent it, but it is preventability that Tooley thinks is particularly salient
for the foreknowledge dilemma. Tooley says (AN) is very plausible (220).
Notice first that (AN) cannot capture what Tooley intends by accidental
necessity since it immediately follows from (AN) that logically impossible
propositions are accidentally necessary. (AN) therefore must be modified:
(AN2) It is accidentally necessary that p at time t if and only if p is
not logically impossible and no being, either actual or possible, acting at time t, could causally bring it about that p is
false.
Tooley says that given (AN), it can be shown that the transfer of necessity is true for accidental necessity. His demonstration consists of (AN) and
one premise which he asserts is an analytic truth, and which is logically
equivalent to the conclusion he wants to prove. His argument is as follows:
(1)

It is accidentally necessary that p at time t if and only if no
being, actual or possible, acting at time t, could causally bring it
about that p is false. (AN)

Tooley follows this with the premise he takes to be analytic:
(2)

If P entails q, then causally to bring it about that q is false is also
causally to bring it about that p is false.

From (2) it follows that
(3)

If P entails q, and some actual or possible being, acting at time t
could causally bring it about that q is false, then that being, acting at t, could also bring it about that p is false.

By contraposition he gets
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If P entails q, and no actual or possible being, acting at time t,
could causally bring it about that p is false, then no actual or
possible being, acting at time t, could causally bring it about
that q is false.

By (AN) he concludes
(5)

If P entails q, and it is accidentally necessary that p at t, then it is
accidentally necessary that q at t. (Transfer of Accidental
Necessity Principle)

Notice first that (2), which Tooley takes to be an analytic truth, is false. If
p is logically impossible, p entails q no matter what q is. Hence, according
to (2), to causally bring about that some q is false is to causally bring it about
that a logically impossible proposition is false. But surely we do not get
causal credit for bringing about the falsehood of every logically impossible
proposition whenever we bring about the falsehood of some other proposition. So we must add the qualification that p is not impossible to (2):
(2a) If p entails q and p is not logically impossible, then causally to bring
it about that q is false is also causally to bring it about that pis false. 12
But whether or not (2) is modified as (2a), it is just another form of the
transfer of necessity principle that Tooley wants to prove. The conclusion is
logically equivalent to the premise, as his own argument shows. And if (4)
is not analytic, neither is (2), so the argument above is hardly a proof of it.
So Tooley does not have a proof of his transfer principle. Notice also
that his transfer principle (5) is not a standard transfer of necessity principle, but is equivalent to the transfer of causability principle (TCP):
causable p, nec (p ->q) > causable q.
The equivalence follows from the fact that to cause p to be true is to cause
not p to be false. Hence, TCP is equivalent to
Nec (p -> q), causable not p is false> causable not q is false.
By contraposition and exportation we get
Nec (not q -> not p), causable not p is false> causable not q is false,
which by substitution is equivalent to
Nec (p -> q), causable q is false> causable p is false.
By exportation we get
Nec (p ->q) > (causable q is false> causable p is false).
And contraposition yields
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Nec (p ->q) > (not causable p is false> not causable q is false),
which is the same as Tooley's (4). His (5) is a substitution in (4) of his definition of accidental necessity (AN).
So Tooley accepts TCP. That means he is faced with the dilemma of the
causal arrow. Given his acceptance of TCP (suitably modified to TCP2), if
he is serious about the assumption of temporal causal asymmetry to which
he appeals in explaining accidental necessity, he must reject the possibility
of entailments between propositions about the past and propositions about
the future, not just the possibility of infallible foreknowledge of the contingent future, as shown in section II.
In explaining his own position, Tooley says, "If, as I have argued in
detail elsewhere, the future is not real, then I think it can be shown that it is
logically impossible for anyone to have knowledge of future states of
affairs unless those states of affairs are causally determined." (223). But if
the futurity of the future makes it unreal, then the causally determined
future is unreal also. And if unreality is sufficient to make something
unknowable, the determined future should be unknowable as well. In any
case, the problem is not knowability; it is a problem about logical relations
between past and future propositions.

IV. Conclusion
In this paper I have argued that the perennial dilemma of infallible foreknowledge and free will is not unique to either foreknowledge or free will.
The problem arises for a multitude of metaphysical hypotheses in addition
to the hypothesis of essential omniscience, and it reveals an inconsistency
between any of these hypotheses and a common view of the asymmetry of
time. No particular solution to the problem is forced. We are neither forced
to give up temporal asymmetry nor the possibility that there are entailments
between propositions about the past and the future, nor are we forced to
give up the principle that the relevant type of temporally asymmetrical
modality is closed under entailment. But we are forced to give up one of the
three. The choice ought to be made on metaphysical grolmds, retaining as
much as possible our firmest intuitions about time and causality.
Notice that any approach to the classic dilemma of theological fatalism
that is specifically designed to handle essential omniscience, such as the
timelessness move or the Ockhamist move, will not help with the dilemmas
of this paper. It is, of course, possible, perhaps likely, that there is more than
one solution to the foreknowledge/free will dilemma, but whatever solves
the dilemmas of this paper will solve the foreknowledge dilemma as well.
Notice also that the problem of this paper is independent of determinism.
It is sometimes argued that if determinism is true, there is no problem of theological fatalism because determinism has the consequence that whatever
kind of freedom we have is compatible with the inability to do otherwise. But
the problem of this paper arises whether or not freedom requires the ability to
do otherwise since freedom is not the problem. There is a conflict within a
common view of time whether or not the universe is causally determin.ed.
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NOTES

1. I am assuming that both causally contingent and causally necessary
events exist. If all events are causally necessary, it is obvious that causal necessity is not the same thing as the necessity of the past.
2. I will not distinguish logical and metaphysical necessity in this paper. I
asssume that a logically or metaphysically necessary proposition is one that is
true in all possible worlds.
3. I first presented a form of this argument in the Appendix to The
Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge (Oxford University Press, 1991). A version close to the one here appears in "Omniscience, Time, and Freedom," Guide
to Philosophy of Religion, edited by William Mann, forthcoming, Blackwell. In
that paper I did not notice that TPP is used in the inference to (4). I thank Ray
Elugardo for pointing that out to me.
4. The view called the Open God view or Free Will theism has the position that God takes the risk of not having infallible foreknowledge in order to
give humans free will. But if my argument here is right, there is nothing to give
up because infallible foreknowledge is metaphysically impossible if time is
modally asymmetrical and TNP holds. If time is not modally asymmetrical or
TNP is false, giving up infallible foreknowledge is not necessary. For a defense
of the open God view see Clark Pinnock, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William
Hasker, and David Basinger. The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the
Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 1994).
5. I suggest that the modal asymmetry of time is incoherent in
"Omniscience, Time, and Freedom."
6. Notice that the option of rejecting (b') also rules out the possibility that
the following propositions are both logically equivalent and have different
temporal modalities:
(1) It was true yesterday that X would happen tomorrow.
(2) X will happen tomorrow.
Either (1) and (2) are not logically equivalent or it is not the case that (1) has the
necessity of the past whereas (2) does not. Propositions like (1) and (2) are, of
course, the ones typically used in arguments for logical fatalism. This shows
that the deeper problem of logical fatalism is not a problem about fatalism
either.
7. Principle (ii) will need a qualification if there are events that are literally
uncaused, such as the decay of an atom of plutonium. I assume that such
events do not affect the causability of the ordinary events that are the topic of
this paper. I thank Bill Hasker for pointing out this problem with the principle
of the causability of the future.
S. These principles are forms of what William Hasker calls "Power
Entailment Principles," which he defends in a number of places. See God, Time,
and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), and "Zagzebski on
Power Entailment," Faith and Philosophy 10, #2 (April 1993), 2250-255, and my
rejoinder in the same issue.
9. I thank Dan Speak for this example.
10. Note that TNP and TPP would fail if sentences of the form "It is nowpossible that p" and "It is now-necessary that p" are hyper-intensional. A context U is hyper-intensional when logically equivalent propositions are not intersubstitutable in U. For example, belief contexts are hyper-intensional since we
cannot substitute "The even prime number is greater than I" for "2 is greater
than 1" in the sentence "Sally believes that 2 is greater than 1." Sally may be a
young child who knows that 2 is greater than 1, but has never heard of prime
numbers. If contexts of temporally relative modality are hyper-intensional, the
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proposition The essentially omnisicient foreknower believed B before now is not intersubstitutable with the logically equivalent proposition B in (2) and (2'). Unlike
belief contexts, however, I doubt that we can appeal to our intuitions to settle
the issue of whether temporally modal contexts are hyper-intensional.
11. Michael Tooley, "Freedom and Foreknowledge," Faith and Philosophy
17.2 (April 2000), 212-224.
12. Bill Hasker has observed to me that Tooley's (2) is false for another reason. It may be that p is false for some reason that is independent of the truth of
q. For example, p might be the proposition Hasker is short of money and AI Gore
is US President, and q is the proposition Hasker is short of money. I can cause the
falsehood of q by giving Hasker money, but I do not thereby cause the falsehood of p, which is already false.

